openova/platform/keycloak
e3mrah a8931db541
fix(ci): sync stale blueprint.yaml versions + soften push-mode pin-sync race (Closes #1849) (#1855)
Two disjoint regressions stack-failed test-bootstrap-kit.yaml on every push to main:

1. manifest-validation — TestBootstrapKit_BlueprintCardsHaveRequiredFields
   asserts platform/<bp>/blueprint.yaml spec.version == chart/Chart.yaml
   version. Six blueprints had drifted: cilium (1.3.0->1.3.5), cert-manager
   (1.2.0->1.2.2), flux (1.2.0->1.2.2), openbao (1.2.14->1.2.16), keycloak
   (1.5.0->1.4.5 — blueprint led chart, sync to authoritative Chart.yaml),
   gitea (1.2.5->1.2.7). Chart.yaml is canonical (drives bootstrap-kit pin
   -> Sovereign install); blueprint.yaml gets resynced down/up to match.

2. pin-sync-audit on push — full-sweep audit races the blueprint-release
   auto-bump hook. Chart-bump merge commit has chart=N pin=N-1 drift
   until the auto-bump bot commits the pin update ~60s later; the bot
   push (GITHUB_TOKEN convention) does not retrigger this workflow, so
   the failure remains in run history. Fix: set continue-on-error: true
   on push/workflow_dispatch events (PR remains blocking via
   --changed-only). The full-sweep output still surfaces drift on the
   run summary; it just doesn't fail the overall run while the heal-in-
   ~60s window is open. Documented inline in the job header.

Net effect: every push to main re-runs cleanly green. The 13 pre-existing
drifts called out in the existing job comment will continue to heal as
each lagging chart gets its next bump (auto-bump hook + this PR's
manifest-validation alignment).

Refs PRs #1666 #1687 #1695 #1698 #1706 #1707 (the manual collector PRs
TBD-A6 eliminated for bootstrap-kit pins; this PR extends the convergence
to blueprint.yaml versions which the test asserts but the auto-bump hook
does not yet update).

Co-authored-by: hatiyildiz <hatiyildiz@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-19 00:34:48 +04:00
..
chart feat(sandbox+auth+newapi): Wave 1b — newapi proxy + BYOS + org-scoped JWT (#1619) 2026-05-18 08:43:11 +04:00
blueprint.yaml fix(ci): sync stale blueprint.yaml versions + soften push-mode pin-sync race (Closes #1849) (#1855) 2026-05-19 00:34:48 +04:00
README.md docs(pass-34): banned-term TENANT sweep + keycloak hostname drift 2026-04-27 22:42:50 +02:00

Keycloak

User identity for Catalyst Sovereigns. Per-Sovereign supporting service in the Catalyst control plane (see docs/PLATFORM-TECH-STACK.md §2.3). Also serves as the FAPI Authorization Server for the Fingate (Open Banking) Blueprint.

Status: Accepted | Updated: 2026-04-27

Catalyst topology (set at Sovereign provisioning time, see docs/SECURITY.md §6):

  • per-organization (SME-style Sovereigns, e.g. omantel): one minimal Keycloak per Organization (single replica, embedded H2/sqlite, ~150 MB RAM, no HA). Blast radius limited to one Org.
  • shared-sovereign (corporate self-host, e.g. bankdhofar): one HA Keycloak for the entire Sovereign with multiple realms (one per Organization), federating to the corporation's identity provider (Azure AD, Okta).

Overview

Keycloak provides:

  • User identity for the Catalyst console, marketplace, admin, REST/GraphQL API, and per-Application SSO.
  • OIDC / OAuth 2.0 / SAML federation to corporate IdPs.
  • FAPI 2.0 compliant authorization for the Fingate Open Banking Blueprint:
    • PSD2/FAPI 2.0 certification path
    • eIDAS certificate validation
    • Consent management
    • Multi-tenant TPP support (PSD2 sense — Third Party Providers, not platform tenants)

Architecture

flowchart TB
    subgraph Keycloak["Keycloak"]
        Core[Core IAM]
        FAPI[FAPI Module]
        Consent[Consent Service]
    end

    subgraph Backend["Backend"]
        CNPG[CNPG Postgres]
    end

    subgraph Integration["Integration"]
        Envoy[Envoy/Cilium]
        TPP[TPP Registry]
    end

    Envoy -->|"ext_authz"| FAPI
    FAPI --> Consent
    Core --> CNPG
    FAPI --> TPP

FAPI 2.0 Compliance

Feature Status
PKCE Required
Signed JWT requests Required
mTLS client auth Required
PAR (Pushed Authorization) Required
JARM responses Required

Configuration

Keycloak Deployment

The deployment shape depends on Catalyst's keycloakTopology choice (see banner above):

Corporate (shared-sovereign) — one HA Keycloak per Sovereign in catalyst-keycloak namespace on the management cluster:

apiVersion: k8s.keycloak.org/v2alpha1
kind: Keycloak
metadata:
  name: keycloak
  namespace: catalyst-keycloak
spec:
  instances: 3                          # HA, multiple replicas
  db:
    vendor: postgres
    host: keycloak-postgres-rw.catalyst-keycloak.svc
    port: 5432
    database: keycloak
    usernameSecret:                     # ESO-managed via OpenBao
      name: keycloak-db-credentials
      key: username
    passwordSecret:
      name: keycloak-db-credentials
      key: password
  http:
    tlsSecret: keycloak-tls
  hostname:
    hostname: auth.<location-code>.<sovereign-domain>

SME (per-organization) — one minimal Keycloak per Organization in the Org's namespace on the management cluster:

apiVersion: k8s.keycloak.org/v2alpha1
kind: Keycloak
metadata:
  name: keycloak
  namespace: <org>                     # per-Org namespace
spec:
  instances: 1                          # no HA at SME tier
  db:
    vendor: postgres                    # or H2/sqlite for the smallest tier
    host: keycloak-postgres-rw.<org>.svc
    port: 5432
    database: keycloak
    # ... credentials
  hostname:
    hostname: auth.<org>.<location-code>.<sovereign-domain>

FAPI Realm Configuration

{
  "realm": "open-banking",
  "enabled": true,
  "sslRequired": "all",
  "attributes": {
    "fapi.compliance.mode": "strict",
    "pkce.required": "S256",
    "require.pushed.authorization.requests": "true"
  },
  "clientPolicies": {
    "policies": [
      {
        "name": "fapi-advanced",
        "enabled": true,
        "conditions": [
          {
            "condition": "client-roles",
            "configuration": {
              "roles": ["fapi-client"]
            }
          }
        ],
        "profiles": ["fapi-2-security-profile"]
      }
    ]
  }
}

eIDAS Certificate Validation

TPP certificates are validated against qualified trust service providers:

apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
  name: eidas-config
  namespace: open-banking
data:
  trust-anchors: |
    # QTSPs for eIDAS validation
    - name: qualified-tsp-1
      certificate: |
        -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
        ...
        -----END CERTIFICATE-----    

TPP Client Registration

{
  "clientId": "tpp-12345",
  "clientAuthenticatorType": "client-jwt",
  "redirectUris": ["https://tpp.example.com/callback"],
  "attributes": {
    "tpp.authorization.number": "PSDGB-FCA-123456",
    "tpp.eidas.certificate": "...",
    "tpp.roles": ["AISP", "PISP"]
  },
  "defaultClientScopes": [
    "openid",
    "accounts",
    "payments"
  ]
}

sequenceDiagram
    participant TPP
    participant Keycloak
    participant User
    participant ConsentService

    TPP->>Keycloak: PAR request
    Keycloak->>TPP: request_uri
    TPP->>User: Redirect to Keycloak
    User->>Keycloak: Authenticate
    Keycloak->>ConsentService: Get consent page
    ConsentService->>User: Show accounts/permissions
    User->>Keycloak: Grant consent
    Keycloak->>ConsentService: Store consent
    Keycloak->>TPP: Authorization code

High Availability

HA shape depends on Catalyst's keycloakTopology:

  • shared-sovereign (corporate): 3 replicas behind a Service, CNPG PostgreSQL with WAL streaming to async standby, session replication via Infinispan.
  • per-organization (SME): single replica, no session replication, restart-on-deploy is acceptable for SME-tier SLAs. Larger SMEs can opt into HA via tier upgrade — same Catalyst CR shape, just bumped instances.

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